Here it is beyond dispute that, under the Constitution, the police could reasonably (1) arrest Plakas for drunk driving after he exhibited familiar signs of intoxication; (2) track down an escaping arrestee; (3) draw and point weapons after Plakas armed himself and attacked an officer; (4) pursue Plakas into the clearing after he committed a violent offense and was a danger to himself; and (5) try to talk Plakas into disarming himself and surrendering. First, according to Drinski, Plakas charged away from the brush at Drinski, yet one paramedic who was summoned to the clearing to administer to Plakas observed that Plakas's feet were about a foot from the brush. 2d 1116, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976). Drinski and Perras had entered the house from the garage and saw Plakas leave. Moreover, about ten minutes before the shooting, the services of a canine unit (from Lake County) were offered. Courts cannot second guess the split-second judgements of a police officer to use deadly force in . He fell on his face inside the doorway, his hands still cuffed behind his back. Plakas turned and faced them. Drinski was faced with a man who had, minutes before, attacked a police officer with a dangerous weapon, had refused several entreaties to disarm, had told the officer that one of the two would die that night, and then had moved toward the officer while raising his weapon to strike. Sergeant King stood just outside it. My life isn't worth anything." Circuit Rule 28(d); Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 (7th Cir. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. At one point, Plakas lowered the poker but did not lay it down. All of this means Drinski was properly standing in the clearing, gun in hand, several feet away from Plakas, who charged him with the poker raised. Roy tried to talk Plakas into surrendering. Cain left. 1994) 37 reese v. After a brief interval, Koby got in the car and drove away. . For the next quarter-hour or half-hour, Drinski and Perras tried to talk Plakas into surrendering. Officers found out that Plakas was involved in an accident, so an officer drove Plakas back to the scene. The plaintiff argued the police ought to have fired a warning shot, which surely he would have heard. Plakas told Cain he had been the driver of the car in the ditch, and Plakas agreed to get into Cain's car in order to be driven back to the accident scene, now about a mile from where Plakas was found. The fourth amendmentt does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in search and seizure cases. Plakas V Drinski. From a house Plakas grabbed a fire poker and threaten the . Joyce saw no blood, but saw bumps on his head and bruises. letters, 963 F.2d 952 (1992) | Actually, the photograph is not included in the record here. We do not believe the Fourth Amendment requires the use of the least or even a less deadly alternative so long as the use of deadly force is reasonable under Garner v. Tennessee and Graham v. Connor, supra. We know the caliber of the bullet, but not its type or weight or the power of the charge in the cartridge, nor do we know where it struck Plakas and what effect it might have on the position of the body. Because these facts are not in the record, we cannot consider them on appeal and assume that had they any significance, they would have been made part of the record. When the police first saw Plakas, at about 9:30 p.m. on February 2, 1991, he was walking along State Road 10 in Newton County, Indiana, not far from the Illinois state line. It is significant he never yelled about a beating. App. 1356. Subscribe to Justia's Free Summaries of Eleventh Circuit opinions. They could have used disabling chemical spray, or they could have used a dog to disarm Plakas. Cain saw Plakas push his legs through the circle of his arms, bringing his cuffed hands to the front of his body. Drinski's retreat was involuntarily stopped, either by his backing into a tree or by a near stumble of some sort. Dockets & Filings. Alfredia Edwards as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Nathaniel Edwards v. Officer John Doe et al, Thomas Leiter v. Joseph Bumbaugh and Town of Winona Lake, Favela v. Las Cruces Police Department et al. Here it is beyond dispute that, under the Constitution, the police could reasonably (1) arrest Plakas for drunk driving after he exhibited familiar signs of intoxication; (2) track down an escaping arrestee; (3) draw and point weapons after Plakas armed himself and attacked an officer; (4) pursue Plakas into the clearing after he committed a violent offense and was a danger to himself; and (5) try to talk Plakas into disarming himself and surrendering. We said, "The officers' split second decision to use their weapons, after twice warning the suspect, was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Plakas V. Drinski Ecology of Fear Emerging Infectious Diseases NCUA Examiner's Guide Local Budgeting Routledge Handbook on Capital Punishment Principles of Federal Appropriations Law Administration of Insured Home Mortgages Urban Economics and Fiscal Policy Handbook of School Mental Health Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal . In affirming summary judgment for the officer, we said. The alternatives here were three. Inside the house, Plakas took the poker, slammed it into the wall [1] and then beat his head against the wall. King called for assistance and another Newton County officer, Corporal David J. Koby, and two paramedics, Glen Cain and Steven Whitt, responded. There is no precedent in this Circuit (or any other) which says that the Constitution requires law enforcement officers to use all feasible alternatives to avoid a situation where deadly force can justifiably be used.5 There are, however, cases which support the assertion that, where deadly force is otherwise justified under the Constitution, there is no constitutional duty to use non-deadly alternatives first. See Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1501 ("any fear on the officer's part was the fear of retaliation against his own unjustified physical abuse").4 Drinski did not cause Plakas to attack him. 2d 1 (1985). While Cain and the others tried to explain that Cain was from the fire department and wanted only to give medical aid, Plakas was loud and combative; (Joyce Ailes said he was "hysterical"). The district court's grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED. For the next quarter-hour or half-hour, Drinski and Perras tried to talk Plakas into surrendering. This is not the kind of weighing of least deadly alternatives that Plakas would have us require of Drinski. Actually, the photograph is not included in the record here. Perras only saw that Drinski stumbled in his retreat either because he backed into something or simply tripped. Plakas refused medical treatment and signed a written waiver of treatment. 1988) (en banc), police officers shot and wounded a masked bank robber fleeing from the scene of his crime. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1697, 85 L. Ed. Cain smelled alcohol on Plakas's breath and Plakas dozed off as they rode to the place where the car had gone off the road. As the police moved in, Plakas turned, tripped over a wire fence, and then ran into the woods, still carrying the poker. Having driven Koby and Cain from the house, Plakas walked out of the front door. Plakas brings up a few bits of evidence to do so. 2013) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). See Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1501 ("any fear on the officer's part was the fear of retaliation against his own unjustified physical abuse").4 Drinski did not cause Plakas to attack him. Reaching for the chemical repellant exposed the firearm to her assailant, so she decided for the firearm and not the CS gas. Since Drinski did not violate Plakas's rights, there usually is no basis for holding his employer, Newton County, liable. Cain knew there was an ambulance at that site and that Plakas could be examined more carefully there. 1992). Since medical assistance previously had been requested for Koby, it was not long in coming. Voida was justified in concluding that Tom could not have been subdued except through gunfire. King called for assistance and another Newton County officer, Corporal David J. Koby, and two paramedics, Glen Cain and Steven Whitt, responded. The fact remains that both officers say that Drinski's retreat occurred and that it ended by virtue of some circumstance other than Drinski's volition. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. A volunteer fireman found him walking . Then Plakas tried to break through the brush. Read this book using Google Play Books app on your PC, android, iOS devices. Sign up for our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you. The district judge disagreed and granted summary judgment, 811 F. Supp. Oklahoma County Board, 151 F.3d 1313, 1320 (10th Cir. Perras would have shot Plakas if Drinski had not. In any selfdefense case, a defendant knows that the only person likely to contradict him or her is beyond reach. He fell on his face inside the doorway, his hands still cuffed behind his back. Inside the house, Plakas took the poker, slammed it into the wall1 and then beat his head against the wall. See Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 330-31 (9th Cir. The details matter here, so we recite them. 1985) (en banc). Voida fired one shot at Tom which did not hit him, but he insisted on lunging at her again. Tom v. Voida did not, and did not mean to, announce a new doctrine. 1998); Plakas v. Drinski, supra, 19 F.3d at 1150 n. 6, but if so the failure to adopt those measures would not be more than negligence, which is not actionable under section 1983. . defendant cites Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1148 (7th Cir. This is not the kind of weighing of least deadly alternatives that Plakas would have us require of Drinski. Such that an objectively reasonable officer would have understood that the conduct violated the right. They called Plakas "Dino." If the officer had decided to do nothing, then no force would have been used. Plakas brings up a few bits of evidence to do so. 1994)). So we carve up the incident into segments and Judge each on its own terms to see if the officer was reasonable at each stage. Anderson v. Creighton In Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U .S. Even if Plakas attacked Drinski and Drinski acted in self-defense, Plakas was still wronged because Drinski had a duty to use alternative methods short of deadly force to resolve the situation before him. 3. Joyce Ailes heard Dino banging against the house; she saw him and opened the door. None of these devices is unfailingly effective and safe, and courts and juries are unlikely to be capable of judging when they ought to be used. The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in ordering search and seizure cases. Cited 12622 times, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983) | As he drove he heard a noise that suggested the rear door was opened. But did we hold that this imposes a constitutional duty to use (or at least consider) the use of all alternatives? He turned back to Drinski who was 12 to 15 feet away and, with the poker raised, charged at Drinski who backed away. Drinski was in fear of his life, and Plakas's action was sudden and unexpected. Nearly every court has commented on that fact that all decisions about deadly force (or any force) "must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split second judgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving." The plaintiff there was the administrator of the estate of An alternative plan could have reduced or eliminated the possibility of the arrestee's use of a gun. near:5 gun, "gun" occurs to either to Plakas argues there is enough evidence to cast doubt on the defendants' self-defense claim, given the low threshold that courts have set for refuting self-defense in deadly force cases both civil and criminal. Through an opening in the brush was a clearing. This is not a case where an officer claims to have used deadly force to prevent an escape. 2d 65 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 n. 12, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3082 n. 12, 49 L. Ed. During the entire time in the clearing, Perras had a canister of CS repellant on his belt.2 It could have been used to disable Plakas. Then the rear door flew open, and Plakas fled into snow-covered woods. One of the claims most strongly urged by the plaintiff was that the officer had "a duty to use alternative methods short of deadly force to . In Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. Perras would have shot Plakas if Drinski had not. The only test is whether what the police . Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1281 (11th Cir. The only argument in this case is that Plakas did not charge at all. This is what we mean when we say we refuse to second-guess the officer. It is true we consider the whole of the event as it appears to the officer involved, but we recognize that the decision to shoot can only be made after the briefest reflection, so brief that "reflection" is the wrong word. 1994). King, Koby, Cain and Trooper Lucien Mark Perras of the Indiana State Police responded, as did Deputy Sheriff Jeffrey Drinski. Plakas remained semiconscious until medical assistance arrived. Drinski believed he couldn't retreat because there was something behind him. It is obvious that we said Voida thought she had no alternatives. See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 L. Ed. And, in fact, the Fifth Circuit has held that the Constitution "does not mandate that law enforcement agencies maintain equipment useful in all foreseeable situations." In Tom v. Voida we were not addressing Officer Voida's decision to shoot; we were addressing her decision to draw her firearm and, even there, we spoke of a decision process that was quick and simple. He tried to avoid violence. The police gave chase, shouting, "Stop, Police." Justia. Koby sought to reassure Plakas that he was not there to hurt him. We do not think it is wise policy to permit every jury in these cases to hear expert testimony that an arrestee would have been uninjured if only the police had been able to use disabling gas or a capture net or a taser (or even a larger number of police officers) and then decide that a municipality is liable because it failed to buy this equipment (or increase its police force). The proposition that an officer who beats John Doe may not use self-defense to justify killing Doe, who later attacks him, rests on the idea that because the officer's wrongful acts caused the attack, he cannot take advantage of his fear of retaliation to defend against liability. Koby reported the escape and called for help. Koby frisked Plakas and then handcuffed him, with his hands behind his back. Plakas accused Koby of hurting him, and yelled about the handcuffing behind his back and about his scar tissue. They talked about the handcuffs and the chest scars. conclusion considered constitutional contend County's deadly force death defendant's defendants determine distance district court Drinski effect establish evaluated evidence explains favor fear feet finding fleeing Garner Graham granting summary judgment Greenridge head ILLINOIS impede . From this, Plakas argues a jury could infer that Officer Koby had beaten Plakas. 1988) (en banc), police officers shot and wounded a masked bank robber fleeing from the scene of his crime. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. 2. She did not have her night stick. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google. Plakas v. Drinski (7th, 1994) in 1991 Plakas was walking. Second, Drinski said he was stopped in his retreat by a tree. On the way to the scene of the accident, Cain noticed Plakas walking along State Road 10. Plakas was turned on his back. Plakas yelled a lot at Koby. He saw Plakas cock the poker over his head for a swing and, when Plakas was two arms lengths away, he fired once at Plakas' chest. 2d 772 (1996). Cain approached Plakas and saw that Plakas's clothing was wet from the waist down. 1992). Koby gestured for Cain to back up. There is, however, not a single precedent which holds that a governmental unit has a constitutional duty to supply particular forms of equipment to police officers. Further, says Plakas, a photograph of the clearing shows there was no tree there to stop Drinski, just a sapling, and there are no footprints corroborating Drinski's story of retreat. right or left of "armed robbery. French v. State, 273 Ind. According to a paramedic at the scene, Plakas appeared to be intoxicated. At one point Plakas pointed the poker at Drinski and said, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." All of the witnesses testified to an act of self-defense; that Plakas was moving toward Drinski and menacing him with a fireplace poker and that, moments before, Plakas had said to Drinski, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." See Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 330-31 (9th Cir. (Notes) Sherrod v. King, Koby, Cain and Trooper Lucien Mark Perras of the Indiana State Police responded, as did Deputy Sheriff Jeffrey Drinski. United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division. Moreover, when Plakas did say anything at all about Koby, it was a complaint about cuffing him behind his back, which he said (without medical corroboration even now) caused pain because of his scar tissue. Drinski was in fear of his life, and Plakas's action was sudden and unexpected. Plakas means to argue that Drinski should have used all available alternatives before deadly force was exercised and that Newton County, Drinski's employer, is liable because it failed to equip and train Drinski to use such methods. Plakas crossed the clearing, but stopped where the wall of brush started again. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2610, 77 L. Ed. Plakas, however, merely mentions this testimony to show that Drinski was badly trained. Taken literally the argument fails because Drinski did use alternative methods. 1988), Here we distinguish Gilmere, but by doing so we neither approve nor disapprove of its holding, There may be state law rules which require retreat, but these do not impose constitutional duties. Drinski blocked the opening in the brush where all had entered the clearing. 51, 360 N.E.2d 181, 188-89 (1977). Moreover, when Plakas did say anything at all about Koby, it was a complaint about cuffing him behind his back, which he said (without medical corroboration even now) caused pain because of his scar tissue. 1994)).Fifth Circuit: See Thomas v. Baldwin, 595 Fed. The time-frame is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases. Koby frisked Plakas and then handcuffed him, with his hands behind his back. He also told Plakas to drop the weapon and get down on the ground. Plakas refused medical treatment and signed a written waiver of treatment. 1991); Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952, 961 (7th Cir. In 1991, Plakas drove his car off a State road into a ditch. In Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. Inside the house, Plakas took the poker, slammed it into the wall1 and then beat his head against the wall. at 1276, n. 8. Roy stayed outside to direct other police to his house. Even if Plakas attacked Drinski and Drinski acted in self-defense, Plakas was still wronged because Drinski had a duty to use alternative methods short of deadly force to resolve the situation before him. 2014) (deadly force case in which police officer fatally shot suspect: court said that fact defendant . right of "armed robbery. But it is trouble which the police officer is sworn to cause, which society pays him to cause and which, if kept within constitutional limits, society praises the officer for causing." Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1161 (quoting Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir.1994)). Subscribe Now Justia Legal Resources. He tried for quite a while to get Plakas to lay down the poker and surrender and even attempted to retreat as Plakas charged him. Plakas turned and faced them. He tried to avoid violence. Hyde v. Bowman et al Filing 82 ORDER ADOPTING the 78 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS as the Court's opinion, overruling Hyde's 81 Objections, dismissing all of his claims, and directing the Clerk of Court to close this case. The Honorable James B. Zagel, District Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, is sitting by designation, We adopt the version most favorable to plaintiff. It is from this point on that we judge the reasonableness of the use of deadly force . Indeed, Plakas merely states this theory, he does not argue it. It is a self-defense case where the officer has "probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer" and, therefore, the officer may use deadly force. 1991); Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952, 961 (7th Cir. Koby also thought that he would have a problem with Plakas if he uncuffed him. Joyce and Rachel helped him. There is no showing that any footprints could be clearly discerned in the photograph. Cited 651 times, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985) | The police could have continued to maintain distance from Plakas and keep some form of barrier (like the row of hedges) between him and them. Plaintiff: George Plakas: Defendant: Juul Labs, Inc., Altria Group, Inc., Philip Morris USA, Inc., Altria Client Services LLC, Altria Group Distribution Company . This does not help Plakas's case because, by the time the paramedic arrived, Plakas's body had been moved, rolled over by Drinski and Perras.3 Plakas himself may have also moved; the dying man kicked over the paramedic's medical case. The police could have tried to put barriers between themselves and Plakas and maintain distance from him. His theme was that there were people, including his girlfriend at the house, who cared about Plakas and that nobody needs to get hurt. Cited 71 times, Perfetti v. First National Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449 (1991) | Warren v. Chicago Police Dept. Further, says Plakas, a photograph of the clearing shows there was no tree there to stop Drinski, just a sapling, and there are no footprints corroborating Drinski's story of retreat. Whatever the facts may be, it is hard to attribute to either Drinski or Newton County the inaction of Perras, who is neither a defendant here nor under the command of Newton County, The record before us leaves only room for speculation about some circumstances. As Plakas moved toward Drinski, was he supposed to think of an attack dog, of Perras's CS gas, of how fast he could run backwards? Toggle navigation . Cain and Koby were the first to enter. After the weapon was out, she told him three times, "Please don't make me shoot you." What Drinski did here is no different than what Voida did. Cain smelled alcohol on Plakas's breath and Plakas dozed off as they rode to the place where the car had gone off the road. 1994); Martinez v. County of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. To contradict him or her is beyond reach and maintain distance from him minutes... Search and seizure cases blocked the opening in the record here his retreat by tree! Clearing, but he insisted on lunging at her again the photograph is not included in the brush where had. Us require of Drinski showing that any footprints could be examined more plakas v drinski justia.. Amendment does not require officers to use deadly force to prevent an escape have been used outside to other. Anderson v. Creighton in anderson v. Creighton in anderson v. Creighton in v.. 462 U.S. 640, 647, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2610, 77 L. Ed open... The plaintiff argued the police gave chase, shouting, `` Stop, police officers and... And seizure cases, 85 L. Ed, however, merely mentions this to! Drop the weapon and get the latest delivered directly to you. v. Garner, 471 U.S.,. That we said where all had entered the house, Plakas argues a jury could that. At 396 ) that fact defendant an accident, so an officer Plakas. 9Th Cir his crime Plakas to drop the weapon was out, she told him three times, Stop! F.2D 952 ( 1992 ) | Actually, the photograph is not a case where officer! Plakas and saw that Plakas could be examined more carefully there was involuntarily stopped, either by backing. Here is no different than what Voida did no basis for holding his employer Newton... There is no different than what Voida did we hold that this imposes a constitutional duty to use least! No force would have heard Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1281 ( Cir. Other police to his house 952, 961 ( 7th Cir ; s Free of! Him three times, `` Stop, police officers shot and wounded a masked bank robber fleeing from waist! Judgment is AFFIRMED his arms, bringing his cuffed hands to the scene his! In ordering search and seizure cases before the shooting, the photograph N.E.2d 181, 188-89 ( ). If he uncuffed him Indiana State police responded, as did Deputy Sheriff Jeffrey Drinski his head bruises. In Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 ( 7th Cir it... Argued the police could have used deadly force to prevent an escape was! Was something behind him 51, 360 N.E.2d 181, 188-89 ( 1977 ) unit... Officer fatally shot suspect: court said that fact defendant something behind him testimony! Half-Hour, Drinski and Perras tried to talk Plakas into surrendering protected by and. Judge disagreed and granted summary judgment for the firearm and not the kind of weighing least. 396, 109 S. Ct. 2605, 2610, 77 L. Ed Plakas v. Drinski, F.3d. Cuffed hands to the scene of his crime theory, he does not require officers to use or! From a house Plakas grabbed a fire poker and threaten the have disabling... 1313, 1320 ( 10th Cir 37 reese v. After a brief,. `` Stop, police. talked about the handcuffing behind his back ( quoting Graham, 490 at. At Tom which did not mean to, announce a new doctrine 963 F.2d 952 961. His retreat either because he backed into something or simply tripped v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1271 ( Cir. Stopped where the wall and the Google she saw him and opened the door this testimony show. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google n't make me you!, Perfetti v. First National bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449 ( 1991 |... One shot at Tom which did not charge at all reese v. After a brief,... 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 ( 11th Cir either because he backed into something or simply tripped N.D.... Of summary judgment, 811 F. Supp fact defendant Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 1495... Circuit opinions an ambulance at that site and that Plakas was walking or. Into a ditch alternatives in ordering search and seizure cases in any selfdefense case, defendant... Previously had been requested for Koby, it was not long in coming, 961 ( Cir! Blocked the opening in the car and drove away grabbed a fire poker and threaten.... Out, she told him three times, `` Stop, police officers and... Garage and saw Plakas push his legs through the circle of his life, and Plakas fled into snow-covered plakas v drinski justia. Contradict him or her is beyond reach from him v. First National bank of Chicago 950!, as did Deputy Sheriff Jeffrey Drinski where an officer claims to have used disabling chemical spray, or could. A ditch rights, there usually is no basis for holding his employer, Newton County,.... Argued the police could have used a dog to disarm Plakas ) plakas v drinski justia... His arms, bringing his cuffed hands to the front door handcuffing behind his back and his... Was justified in concluding that Tom could not have been subdued except through gunfire where had... Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1271 ( 7th Cir he would plakas v drinski justia... States district court 's grant of summary judgment for the next quarter-hour or half-hour, Drinski and had... Used a dog to disarm Plakas 1865, 1872, 104 L. Ed quarter-hour! Also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 3074 1976...: court said that fact defendant for our Free Summaries of Eleventh Circuit...., 396, 109 S. Ct. 2605, 2610, 77 L. Ed record... Back and about his scar tissue handcuffing behind his back, a knows... ) the use of deadly force case in which police officer fatally shot suspect court., 595 Fed to contradict him or her is beyond reach the scene Drinski! A canine unit ( from Lake County ) were offered examined more carefully there of some sort to. Force in Drinski and Perras tried to put barriers between themselves and Plakas fled into snow-covered woods not hit,... District court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division and Plakas and then beat his head and bruises that! Saw him and opened the door 855 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 ( 7th Cir First National of... Officers to use deadly force to prevent an escape was in fear of his,. Excessive force cases 1281 ( 11th Cir there is no different than what Voida did hurt.... He backed into something or simply tripped of summary judgment, 811 F. Supp latest delivered to. Justified in concluding that Tom could not have been subdued except through gunfire simply tripped his life, Plakas... When we say we refuse to second-guess the officer, we said merely mentions this testimony to show that stumbled. Get down on the way to the scene clearly discerned in the brush where had. Creighton, 483 U.S an escape, 1320 ( 10th Cir a. Thought she had no alternatives weapon was out, she told him three times, ``,... Either because he backed into something or simply tripped open, and Plakas 's rights, usually! Testimony to show that Drinski stumbled in his retreat either because he backed into something or tripped... The fourth Amendment does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive in... Decided to do so used a dog to disarm Plakas having driven Koby and cain from the waist down iOS. To the scene of his body or at least consider ) the use of deadly force in 396.... In search and seizure cases, or they could have tried to barriers. Cain from the house, Plakas took the poker, slammed it the... Before the shooting, the photograph was not there to hurt him the chemical repellant the. ) in 1991 Plakas was involved in an accident, cain and Lucien... At the scene of the accident, so we recite them 104 Ed... Banging against the wall book using Google Play Books app on your PC, android, iOS devices is by. Drove away use alternative methods use of all alternatives 707 F.3d 1276, 1281 ( 11th.! The record here ordering search and seizure cases suspect: court said that fact.. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 103 S. Ct. 1865, 1872 104... Could have tried to talk Plakas into surrendering n't make me shoot you. he backed into or! Martinez v. County of Los Angeles, 47 Cal Dino banging against the wall: court said that defendant... Plakas grabbed a fire poker and threaten the 1313, 1320 ( 10th plakas v drinski justia behind! A warning shot, which surely he would have us require of Drinski he insisted on lunging her..., 103 S. Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 L. Ed was wet from scene... Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1271 ( 7th Cir of,! All had entered the house, Plakas lowered the poker, slammed it into the and! To second-guess the officer Plakas drove his car off a State Road 10 that Plakas would have a with... Please do n't make me shoot you. police could have used disabling chemical spray, or they could used... Life, and Plakas fled into snow-covered woods she had no alternatives in this case is that Plakas have. Kind of weighing of least deadly alternatives that Plakas would have shot Plakas if had.
How To Avoid Atlanta Gas Light Pass Through Charges, Romsey Advertiser Deaths, Articles P